1997•Archive of European Integration (AEI) (University of Pittsburgh)Requires access

"Trade and competition policy in the Europe agreements: Lessons of the EEA experience"

Peter Martin Holmes, Smith

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

In 1991 the European Union (EU) and a group of states belonging to the European Free Trade Area (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland) signed European Economic agreement covering the single market four freedoms, mainly affecting industrial goods. Within this zone all tariffs, non-tariff barriers and contingent protection were abolished and competition rules regulated trade as within the EU. Many have seen this as a model for relations between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), but as well shall show this is an inappropriate analogy. Adoption of common competition rules was only a minor element in the creation of a system of wholly free industrial trade between the EU and the other countries of the EEA. We argue that while the EEA was a useful response to the situation it addressed, it cannot be extrapolated to the case of the CEECs for a number of reasons. The core of the argument is the argument that an agreement by partner countries to adopt EU-style internal competition laws cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent pressure for contingent protection emanating within the EU.

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

In 1991 the European Union (EU) and a group of states belonging to the European Free Trade Area (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland) signed European Economic agreement covering the single market four freedoms, mainly affecting industrial goods. Within this zone all tariffs, non-tariff barriers and contingent protection were abolished and competition rules regulated trade as within the EU. Many have seen this as a model for relations between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), but as well shall show this is an inappropriate analogy. Adoption of common competition rules was only a minor element in the creation of a system of wholly free industrial trade between the EU and the other countries of the EEA. We argue that while the EEA was a useful response to the situation it addressed, it cannot be extrapolated to the case of the CEECs for a number of reasons. The core of the argument is the argument that an agreement by partner countries to adopt EU-style internal competition laws cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent pressure for contingent protection emanating within the EU.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

In 1991 the European Union (EU) and a group of states belonging to the European Free Trade Area (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland) signed European Economic agreement covering the single market four freedoms, mainly affecting industrial goods. Within this zone all tariffs, non-tariff barriers and contingent protection were abolished and competition rules regulated trade as within the EU. Many have seen this as a model for relations between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), but as well shall show this is an inappropriate analogy. Adoption of common competition rules was only a minor element in the creation of a system of wholly free industrial trade between the EU and the other countries of the EEA. We argue that while the EEA was a useful response to the situation it addressed, it cannot be extrapolated to the case of the CEECs for a number of reasons. The core of the argument is the argument that an agreement by partner countries to adopt EU-style internal competition laws cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent pressure for contingent protection emanating within the EU.

Key concepts: Competition (biology), Argument (complex analysis), European union, International trade, Tariff, Single market, International economics, Rules of origin

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
"Trade and competition policy in the Europe agreements: Lessons of the EEA experience" — Research Paper | ScholarLens