"Trade and competition policy in the Europe agreements: Lessons of the EEA experience"
Peter Martin Holmes, Smith
Abstract
Open-access reader
Peter Martin Holmes, Smith
Abstract
Open-access reader
In 1991 the European Union (EU) and a group of states belonging to the European Free Trade Area (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland) signed European Economic agreement covering the single market four freedoms, mainly affecting industrial goods. Within this zone all tariffs, non-tariff barriers and contingent protection were abolished and competition rules regulated trade as within the EU. Many have seen this as a model for relations between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), but as well shall show this is an inappropriate analogy. Adoption of common competition rules was only a minor element in the creation of a system of wholly free industrial trade between the EU and the other countries of the EEA. We argue that while the EEA was a useful response to the situation it addressed, it cannot be extrapolated to the case of the CEECs for a number of reasons. The core of the argument is the argument that an agreement by partner countries to adopt EU-style internal competition laws cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent pressure for contingent protection emanating within the EU.
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In 1991 the European Union (EU) and a group of states belonging to the European Free Trade Area (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland) signed European Economic agreement covering the single market four freedoms, mainly affecting industrial goods. Within this zone all tariffs, non-tariff barriers and contingent protection were abolished and competition rules regulated trade as within the EU. Many have seen this as a model for relations between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), but as well shall show this is an inappropriate analogy. Adoption of common competition rules was only a minor element in the creation of a system of wholly free industrial trade between the EU and the other countries of the EEA. We argue that while the EEA was a useful response to the situation it addressed, it cannot be extrapolated to the case of the CEECs for a number of reasons. The core of the argument is the argument that an agreement by partner countries to adopt EU-style internal competition laws cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent pressure for contingent protection emanating within the EU.
Key concepts: Competition (biology), Argument (complex analysis), European union, International trade, Tariff, Single market, International economics, Rules of origin