Preliminary concepts: materials management in an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository
C.A. Ostenak, W.J. Whitty, Robert J. Dietz
Abstract
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C.A. Ostenak, W.J. Whitty, Robert J. Dietz
Abstract
Open-access reader
Preliminary concepts of materials accountability are presented for an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository. A hypothetical reference repository that receives nuclear waste for emplacement in a geologic medium serves to illustrate specific safeguards concepts. Nuclear wastes received at the reference repository derive from prior fuel-cycle operations. Alternative safeguards techniques ranging from item accounting to nondestructive assay and waste characteristics that affect the necessary level of safeguards are examined. Downgrading of safeguards prior to shipment to the repository is recommended whenever possible. The point in the waste cycle where international safeguards may be terminate depends on the fissile content, feasibility of separation, and practicable recoverability of the waste: termination may not be possible if spent fuels are declared as waste.
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Preliminary concepts of materials accountability are presented for an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository. A hypothetical reference repository that receives nuclear waste for emplacement in a geologic medium serves to illustrate specific safeguards concepts. Nuclear wastes received at the reference repository derive from prior fuel-cycle operations. Alternative safeguards techniques ranging from item accounting to nondestructive assay and waste characteristics that affect the necessary level of safeguards are examined. Downgrading of safeguards prior to shipment to the repository is recommended whenever possible. The point in the waste cycle where international safeguards may be terminate depends on the fissile content, feasibility of separation, and practicable recoverability of the waste: termination may not be possible if spent fuels are declared as waste.
Key concepts: Fissile material, Radioactive waste, Nuclear fuel cycle, Waste management, Spent nuclear fuel, Nuclear material, Nuclear fuel, Environmental science