1982•Transportation quarterlyRequires access

LESSONS FOR AMTRAK AND CONRAIL FROM RAILROADS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

Le Thi Thuong

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

The National Rail Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) was created in 1970 and the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) in 1976 as U.S. government sponsored corporations. They were designated, at the time, as being private, for profit. Such designation is by no means a unique American experience; many national railroads in Western Europe have used a similar provision. There has been a seemingly endless search for an institutional arrangement that provides balance between public control and corporate autonomy. Public corporate autonomy is essential for efficient railroad operation in a competitive and fast-changing transport industry, where boldness, speed and flexibility of business decision making are required. As latecomers to the business of government railroads, American authorities can benefit from studying European experiences. This paper examines how and to what extent the performance of national railroads is attributable to their institutional arrangements.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The National Rail Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) was created in 1970 and the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) in 1976 as U.S. government sponsored corporations. They were designated, at the time, as being private, for profit. Such designation is by no means a unique American experience; many national railroads in Western Europe have used a similar provision. There has been a seemingly endless search for an institutional arrangement that provides balance between public control and corporate autonomy. Public corporate autonomy is essential for efficient railroad operation in a competitive and fast-changing transport industry, where boldness, speed and flexibility of business decision making are required. As latecomers to the business of government railroads, American authorities can benefit from studying European experiences. This paper examines how and to what extent the performance of national railroads is attributable to their institutional arrangements.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The National Rail Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) was created in 1970 and the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) in 1976 as U.S. government sponsored corporations. They were designated, at the time, as being private, for profit. Such designation is by no means a unique American experience; many national railroads in Western Europe have used a similar provision. There has been a seemingly endless search for an institutional arrangement that provides balance between public control and corporate autonomy. Public corporate autonomy is essential for efficient railroad operation in a competitive and fast-changing transport industry, where boldness, speed and flexibility of business decision making are required. As latecomers to the business of government railroads, American authorities can benefit from studying European experiences. This paper examines how and to what extent the performance of national railroads is attributable to their institutional arrangements.

Key concepts: Corporation, Government (linguistics), Autonomy, Business, Flexibility (engineering), Profit (economics), Public administration, Finance

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
LESSONS FOR AMTRAK AND CONRAIL FROM RAILROADS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE — Research Paper | ScholarLens