Clarence C. Morrison
Abstract
In this paper a property tax model is constructed in which the proceeds of the property tax are used to provide a public good. Generally speaking, it is argued that public provision of public goods will not be Pareto optimal in that public provision will result in the oversupply of public goods.
OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In this paper a property tax model is constructed in which the proceeds of the property tax are used to provide a public good. Generally speaking, it is argued that public provision of public goods will not be Pareto optimal in that public provision will result in the oversupply of public goods.
Key concepts: Public good, Economics, Property (philosophy), Property tax, Public economics, Pareto principle, Microeconomics, Ad valorem tax