The Invincible Bomber: Perspectives on The Recognition and Prevention of Airpower Crisis

This study attempts to enhance understanding of the American strategic bombing crisis that occurred in Europe during 1943, when heavy losses of unescorted bombers temporarily derailed the air campaign against Germany. Most analyses of the crisis conclude that the United States erred by not designing a long-range escort fighter earlier. In contrast, this thesis investigates the development, evolution, and execution of Air Corps strategic bombing doctrine over the period from the end of World War I to just following the second Schweinfurt bombing mission in October 1943. Affected by the contextual factors of technological maturity, aircraft production, and military financing, pre-World War II air doctrine focused on the potentially decisive effects of strategic bombing. Gradually, this line of thinking came to dominate the Air Corps, manifesting itself in a powerful and resilient idea that the bomber was invincible. Ultimately, this unofficial doctrine, with its cultural and political baggage, played a major role in shaping the United States' effort in World War II. The wartime manifestation of this doctrine was the creation of the VIII Bomber Command in England. Through the latter half of 1942 and most of 1943, this Command, along with its parent organization, the Eighth Air Force, struggled to implement American strategic bombing theory. That Command's failure to successfully adapt in the face of stiffening Luftwaffe resistance and increasing losses precipitated a crisis, providing valuable historical lessons for air strategists. Understanding the causes of this failure and their relationship to doctrine could prevent analogous situations in the future. This thesis seeks to revamp the common interpretation of the United States' unescorted bombing crisis of World War II using an analytical framework developed by Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow in their book "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis."