The Prospects for Naval Arms Control: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come?
B. Thomas Trout
Abstract
B. Thomas Trout
Abstract
Abstract : This paper assesses the contemporary prospects for naval arms control based on two principal contentions. (1) The political framework of the present arms control environment makes consideration of naval issues virtually certain. The notion that there should be naval arms control is widespread and will probably prove politically compelling if the overall arms control regime continues to develop. (2) The substantive naval issues amenable to negotiation within the prevailing balance are few, but those few are important. Therefore, a position of continuing U.S. Navy resistance to consideration of the subject of naval arms control is not tenable, and may be counterproductive. The Navy has two options for a constructive approach to arms control. One option is to take the initiative on 'soft' issues such as scheduling annual meetings of senior naval officials of the two sides to discuss issues without commitment to negotiate. A second option focuses on the limited range of 'hard' naval arms control issues, sea-launched cruise missiles, tactical naval nuclear weapons, attack submarines and related force questions. Keywords: Balance of power.
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Abstract : This paper assesses the contemporary prospects for naval arms control based on two principal contentions. (1) The political framework of the present arms control environment makes consideration of naval issues virtually certain. The notion that there should be naval arms control is widespread and will probably prove politically compelling if the overall arms control regime continues to develop. (2) The substantive naval issues amenable to negotiation within the prevailing balance are few, but those few are important. Therefore, a position of continuing U.S. Navy resistance to consideration of the subject of naval arms control is not tenable, and may be counterproductive. The Navy has two options for a constructive approach to arms control. One option is to take the initiative on 'soft' issues such as scheduling annual meetings of senior naval officials of the two sides to discuss issues without commitment to negotiate. A second option focuses on the limited range of 'hard' naval arms control issues, sea-launched cruise missiles, tactical naval nuclear weapons, attack submarines and related force questions. Keywords: Balance of power.
Key concepts: Arms control, Control (management), Aeronautics, Operations research, Computer science, Computer security, Political science, History