Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy

Abstract The dispute between impartialists and partialists dominates much modern moral and political philosophy. This book is an attempt to investigate what is at stake between impartialists and their opponents, and to suggest a possible reconciliation. It begins by noting that, in political philosophy, impartiality is normally taken to reflect a belief in the equality of all human beings. However, in a world characterized by plural and competing conceptions of the good, not everyone accepts that all human beings are equal. Belief in equality is part of a comprehensive, and contested, conception of the good. Therefore, if liberal impartiality is to gain support, it must provide an alternative foundation: one which can demonstrate the priority of justice, but which does not depend upon acceptance of a particular conception of the good. I suggest that this foundation is to be found in a form of impartialism that gives centrality to the partial concerns we have for particular others. The fact that we care for particular others can provide a justification for impartialism and can also explain its motivational force.