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1986•Journal of Transport Economics and PolicyRequires access

Ramsey Pricing of Inputs with Downstream Monopoly Power and Regulation: Implications for Railroad Rate Setting

Henry B. McFarland

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Abstract

The rules of Ramsey pricing should be adjusted where the regulated firm is not selling to consumers or to perfectly competitive industries. Some rail charges should be below Ramsey prices.

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The rules of Ramsey pricing should be adjusted where the regulated firm is not selling to consumers or to perfectly competitive industries. Some rail charges should be below Ramsey prices.

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OpenAlex reports 3 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

The rules of Ramsey pricing should be adjusted where the regulated firm is not selling to consumers or to perfectly competitive industries. Some rail charges should be below Ramsey prices.

Key concepts: Downstream (manufacturing), Monopoly, Economics, Microeconomics, Industrial organization, Business, Operations management

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