Re-evaluating Hegel : feminist perspectives on ethics, agency & love

In this thesis, I defend the legitimacy of feminist engagements with the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. To justify his exclusion from feminist theory, Hegel's critics typically focus on what they take to be his patriarchal bias. While we need to take this criticism seriously, I argue that the case is far from definitive. I challenge some common feminist assumptions concerning Hegel, and, on the basis of this critique, seek areas of confluence between feminist and Hegelian philosophy, particularly in regard to ethics, agency and love. By focussing on each of these, I outline some of the ways in which Hegel's thought might be useful to feminist philosophy. I suggest that while some aspects of his thought remain problematic, others have intriguing implications for contemporary social, political and moral feminist theories. I trace Hegel's introduction to feminist thought through Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex. I evaluate the criticisms her engagement with Hegel has attracted, highlighting the shortcomings of her attempt to conflate existentialism with Hegelianism. I suggest that a more representative engagement with Hegel's thought would have much to offer, providing the motivation for what could be an important feminist re-evaluation of his work. In this thesis, I support the project of developing an integrated ethical theory that embraces both reason and emotion as legitimate sources for moral deliberation. I argue that Hegel's work significantly contributes to this project, and go on to examine how his integrated moral theory might facilitate or ground the development of an integrated feminist ethics. I then suggest that Hegel's account of moral deliberation also has important implications for the status of woman's moral agency. I examine the issue of woman's moral agency in terms of the well-developed argument that traditional patriarchal conceptions of rationality exclude her. I explore the claim that Hegel's moral theory situates rationality as the fundamental faculty of moral deliberation, and the resulting charge that such a rationalist theory corrupts and subverts the more inclusive position feminist ethics seeks to promote. In an attempt to defend Hegel, I examine - most importantly in the context of his theory of crime and guilt - his engagement with Sophocles' Antigone. I argue that Hegel does not, here, deny woman the capacity for rational action, but depicts her, rather, as a free, rational and moral agent. I therefore reject the claim that an integrated feminist ethic that engages with Hegelian moral theory would necessarily be undermined by an inherent rationalistic bias. Hegel's theory of woman and his reinforcement of the division of labour between the sexes are the source of continued debate amongst feminist scholars. By focusing on the issue of love, I examine a number of criticisms that Hegel's theory attracts, and explore the problems that these criticisms themselves must face. I evaluate the claim that Hegel's work degrades woman's familial role by making it a duty to the state, and ultimately reject it. I examine the suggestion that his theory of woman can be interpreted as a descriptive rather than prescriptive account of her situation, and suggest that Hegel, within the bounds imposed upon him by history, politics and culture, develops a theory with considerable emancipatory potential; one which reveals a deep appreciation of the forces which drive political and social development.