Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism
Stephen L. Porter
Abstract
Stephen L. Porter
Abstract
Against various detractors (e.g. Wilfred Sellars, Donald Davidson, etc.), this book develops a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. In contrast with Laurence BonJour and borrowing from John McDowell, the essential argument is that conceptualized perpetual experience provides a non-doxastic foundation for perceptual beliefs about physical objects.
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Against various detractors (e.g. Wilfred Sellars, Donald Davidson, etc.), this book develops a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. In contrast with Laurence BonJour and borrowing from John McDowell, the essential argument is that conceptualized perpetual experience provides a non-doxastic foundation for perceptual beliefs about physical objects.
Key concepts: Foundationalism, Epistemology, Philosophy, Argument (complex analysis), Foundation (evidence), Doxastic logic, Political science, Law