Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction of Economic Agents in the Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of the Linear Structure, the Green Effect and Fairness Concern
Olga Gorbaneva, G. A. Ougolnitsky
Abstract
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Olga Gorbaneva, G. A. Ougolnitsky
Abstract
Open-access reader
A comparative analysis of the efficiency of various ways of organization of economic agents is carried out, taking into account the structure and regulations of their interaction in the models of the Cournot oligopoly. The Cournot oligopoly models in the form of a supply chain are constructed and analytically investigated, taking into account the green effect and concern for fairness. For symmetric models of the Cournot oligopoly with different ways of organization of economic agents, the respective structures of social and individual preferences are analytically obtained. A numerical study of the Cournot oligopoly models in various forms with asymmetrical agents has been carried out, and the corresponding structures of social and individual preferences have been obtained.
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A comparative analysis of the efficiency of various ways of organization of economic agents is carried out, taking into account the structure and regulations of their interaction in the models of the Cournot oligopoly. The Cournot oligopoly models in the form of a supply chain are constructed and analytically investigated, taking into account the green effect and concern for fairness. For symmetric models of the Cournot oligopoly with different ways of organization of economic agents, the respective structures of social and individual preferences are analytically obtained. A numerical study of the Cournot oligopoly models in various forms with asymmetrical agents has been carried out, and the corresponding structures of social and individual preferences have been obtained.
Key concepts: Cournot competition, Oligopoly, Economics, Microeconomics, Mathematical economics