Justifying the Environmentalist Agenda

Abstract My View can fairly be characterized as anthropocentric, at least in one sense. As I use the terms, a view is valuationally anthropocentric just in case it involves attribution of intrinsic value only to human beings, and a view is axiologically anthropocentric if its principles favor at least some human interests when these are in conflict with the interests of nonhumans. My view is not valuationally anthropocentric, because it involves attribution of intrinsic value to the satisfaction of every interest of every living thing, whatever its species. However, my view can fairly be described as axiologically anthropocentric, for principle P2’ is that the satisfaction of a ground project creates more value than the satisfaction of any other kind of interest, and I am willing to admit that only human beings have ground projects. And, because I embrace no aggregative principle of obligation, my view provides no way of arguing that a human being’s ground project ought to be doomed despite the fact that, considered in isolation, its satisfaction creates preeminent value. That is, in the axiology of my view (the principles I defend in chapter 4), pride of place is given to certain interests that only humans have.