Further Misconceptions about Moral Relativism
J. W. Cook
Abstract
J. W. Cook
Abstract
Abstract In recent decades discussions of moral relativism have tended to ignore the concerns that led anthropologists in the early years of this century to attach great importance to this doctrine. Recent discussions have focused, instead, on what relativism purports to tell us about the nature of morality. Such discussions are of general philosophical interest, but by ignoring the special concerns of anthropologists they have given rise to some misguided criticisms of moral relativism. In this chapter I will first show that these criticisms miss the mark and will then explain why anthropologists have defended relativism so vigorously.
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Abstract In recent decades discussions of moral relativism have tended to ignore the concerns that led anthropologists in the early years of this century to attach great importance to this doctrine. Recent discussions have focused, instead, on what relativism purports to tell us about the nature of morality. Such discussions are of general philosophical interest, but by ignoring the special concerns of anthropologists they have given rise to some misguided criticisms of moral relativism. In this chapter I will first show that these criticisms miss the mark and will then explain why anthropologists have defended relativism so vigorously.
Key concepts: Relativism, Moral relativism, Morality, Epistemology, Doctrine, Cultural relativism, Philosophy, Law