2006Unpublished venueRequires access

Statutory Interpretation: The Basic Issues

Lisa Heinzerling, Mark Tushnet

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Abstract

Abstract After reading some of the important scholarly writing on statutory interpretation, we turn to several cases of—and on—statutory interpretation. These cases, too, have been important in the literature on statutory interpretation. This chapter concludes with an examination of the role of administrative agencies in interpreting (not simply administering or applying) statutes. Courts and agencies rarely have trouble applying a “clear” statute. Difficulties arise when litigants—and judges—disagree over whether the statute is clear, or agree that it is unclear. In such cases, the statute’s language must be “interpreted,” raising questions such as: What does the statutory language mean, and how are courts to determine its meaning? Should they attempt to identify the underlying purpose of the statutory provision and then interpret it to promote (as best the judges can discern) that purpose? Do statutes have such a purpose? Should judges look to legislative history to give the provision meaning? What other resources might judges use? The readings that follow provide a preliminary examination of these and other questions. Be aware, however, that these materials, and our comments and questions, only scratch the surface of the rich recent discussions of statutory interpretation.

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What this paper is about

Abstract After reading some of the important scholarly writing on statutory interpretation, we turn to several cases of—and on—statutory interpretation. These cases, too, have been important in the literature on statutory interpretation. This chapter concludes with an examination of the role of administrative agencies in interpreting (not simply administering or applying) statutes. Courts and agencies rarely have trouble applying a “clear” statute. Difficulties arise when litigants—and judges—disagree over whether the statute is clear, or agree that it is unclear. In such cases, the statute’s language must be “interpreted,” raising questions such as: What does the statutory language mean, and how are courts to determine its meaning? Should they attempt to identify the underlying purpose of the statutory provision and then interpret it to promote (as best the judges can discern) that purpose? Do statutes have such a purpose? Should judges look to legislative history to give the provision meaning? What other resources might judges use? The readings that follow provide a preliminary examination of these and other questions. Be aware, however, that these materials, and our comments and questions, only scratch the surface of the rich recent discussions of statutory interpretation.

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Available abstract

Abstract After reading some of the important scholarly writing on statutory interpretation, we turn to several cases of—and on—statutory interpretation. These cases, too, have been important in the literature on statutory interpretation. This chapter concludes with an examination of the role of administrative agencies in interpreting (not simply administering or applying) statutes. Courts and agencies rarely have trouble applying a “clear” statute. Difficulties arise when litigants—and judges—disagree over whether the statute is clear, or agree that it is unclear. In such cases, the statute’s language must be “interpreted,” raising questions such as: What does the statutory language mean, and how are courts to determine its meaning? Should they attempt to identify the underlying purpose of the statutory provision and then interpret it to promote (as best the judges can discern) that purpose? Do statutes have such a purpose? Should judges look to legislative history to give the provision meaning? What other resources might judges use? The readings that follow provide a preliminary examination of these and other questions. Be aware, however, that these materials, and our comments and questions, only scratch the surface of the rich recent discussions of statutory interpretation.

Key concepts: Statute, Statutory interpretation, Statutory law, Legislative history, Legislative intent, Interpretation (philosophy), Meaning (existential), Law

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