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Presidential threshold policy in Indonesian presidential election of 2019

Azis Setyagama

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Abstract

In 2019 Indonesia would conduct simultaneous elections to elect legislative and executive members; members of House of Representatives, Regional Representatives Council, President and Vice President. Law No 7/2017 on general election sets the implementation of simultaneous general elections. It regulated Presidential Threshold in which a party or coalition of parties wishing to nominate their cadres to be a president and vice president should meet the requirement of at least 20% seats in the house of representatives or 25% of national valid votes in the previous general election of the House of Representatives. This Presidential Threshold requirement raised the pros and cons for the leaders of political parties in Indonesia. Large parties with many votes in the House of Representatives, would agree on the provisions of this rule, while small party leaders, who did not have a vote in the House of Representatives, would reject the provisions of this rule because it was considered very detrimental to small parties and castrate the people’s right to elect their future leaders. This study used normative approach and sociological studies of the negative impact on the enactment of these provisions in the Indonesian presidential election of 2019.

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What this paper is about

In 2019 Indonesia would conduct simultaneous elections to elect legislative and executive members; members of House of Representatives, Regional Representatives Council, President and Vice President. Law No 7/2017 on general election sets the implementation of simultaneous general elections. It regulated Presidential Threshold in which a party or coalition of parties wishing to nominate their cadres to be a president and vice president should meet the requirement of at least 20% seats in the house of representatives or 25% of national valid votes in the previous general election of the House of Representatives. This Presidential Threshold requirement raised the pros and cons for the leaders of political parties in Indonesia. Large parties with many votes in the House of Representatives, would agree on the provisions of this rule, while small party leaders, who did not have a vote in the House of Representatives, would reject the provisions of this rule because it was considered very detrimental to small parties and castrate the people’s right to elect their future leaders. This study used normative approach and sociological studies of the negative impact on the enactment of these provisions in the Indonesian presidential election of 2019.

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Available abstract

In 2019 Indonesia would conduct simultaneous elections to elect legislative and executive members; members of House of Representatives, Regional Representatives Council, President and Vice President. Law No 7/2017 on general election sets the implementation of simultaneous general elections. It regulated Presidential Threshold in which a party or coalition of parties wishing to nominate their cadres to be a president and vice president should meet the requirement of at least 20% seats in the house of representatives or 25% of national valid votes in the previous general election of the House of Representatives. This Presidential Threshold requirement raised the pros and cons for the leaders of political parties in Indonesia. Large parties with many votes in the House of Representatives, would agree on the provisions of this rule, while small party leaders, who did not have a vote in the House of Representatives, would reject the provisions of this rule because it was considered very detrimental to small parties and castrate the people’s right to elect their future leaders. This study used normative approach and sociological studies of the negative impact on the enactment of these provisions in the Indonesian presidential election of 2019.

Key concepts: Indonesian, Presidential system, Presidential election, Political science, Politics, Law, Philosophy, Linguistics

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