The Objectivist Attempt to Appropriate Subjective Value
David M. Sobel, Steven Wall
Abstract
David M. Sobel, Steven Wall
Abstract
Abstract This chapter explores objectivist responses to the problem of mere taste—the appearance that, at least in such contexts, our unwarranted favoring attitudes play a normative role in determining our good. The chapter critiques objectivist responses that concede this appearance is correct, yet nonetheless maintain that this is compatible with a thoroughgoing objectivism. Some such objectivist responses make use of the “combo view” of the value-bearer—that is, they claim that it is not the object of the attitudes that have value but a combination of the object and the attitude. In responding to such objectivist arguments, the authors’ investigation sorts out the best understanding of the subjective/objective divide. The chapter is unique in sorting through several different such understandings and arguing for the authors’ own favored understanding. With a proper understanding of the divide, the above objectivist moves are revealed to be attempting to appropriate what is really subjective value.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Abstract This chapter explores objectivist responses to the problem of mere taste—the appearance that, at least in such contexts, our unwarranted favoring attitudes play a normative role in determining our good. The chapter critiques objectivist responses that concede this appearance is correct, yet nonetheless maintain that this is compatible with a thoroughgoing objectivism. Some such objectivist responses make use of the “combo view” of the value-bearer—that is, they claim that it is not the object of the attitudes that have value but a combination of the object and the attitude. In responding to such objectivist arguments, the authors’ investigation sorts out the best understanding of the subjective/objective divide. The chapter is unique in sorting through several different such understandings and arguing for the authors’ own favored understanding. With a proper understanding of the divide, the above objectivist moves are revealed to be attempting to appropriate what is really subjective value.
Key concepts: Objectivism, Normative, Value (mathematics), Object (grammar), Epistemology, Psychology, Aesthetics, Sociology