2023Unpublished venueRequires access

The Objectivist Attempt to Appropriate Subjective Value

David M. Sobel, Steven Wall

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter explores objectivist responses to the problem of mere taste—the appearance that, at least in such contexts, our unwarranted favoring attitudes play a normative role in determining our good. The chapter critiques objectivist responses that concede this appearance is correct, yet nonetheless maintain that this is compatible with a thoroughgoing objectivism. Some such objectivist responses make use of the “combo view” of the value-bearer—that is, they claim that it is not the object of the attitudes that have value but a combination of the object and the attitude. In responding to such objectivist arguments, the authors’ investigation sorts out the best understanding of the subjective/objective divide. The chapter is unique in sorting through several different such understandings and arguing for the authors’ own favored understanding. With a proper understanding of the divide, the above objectivist moves are revealed to be attempting to appropriate what is really subjective value.

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Abstract This chapter explores objectivist responses to the problem of mere taste—the appearance that, at least in such contexts, our unwarranted favoring attitudes play a normative role in determining our good. The chapter critiques objectivist responses that concede this appearance is correct, yet nonetheless maintain that this is compatible with a thoroughgoing objectivism. Some such objectivist responses make use of the “combo view” of the value-bearer—that is, they claim that it is not the object of the attitudes that have value but a combination of the object and the attitude. In responding to such objectivist arguments, the authors’ investigation sorts out the best understanding of the subjective/objective divide. The chapter is unique in sorting through several different such understandings and arguing for the authors’ own favored understanding. With a proper understanding of the divide, the above objectivist moves are revealed to be attempting to appropriate what is really subjective value.

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Available abstract

Abstract This chapter explores objectivist responses to the problem of mere taste—the appearance that, at least in such contexts, our unwarranted favoring attitudes play a normative role in determining our good. The chapter critiques objectivist responses that concede this appearance is correct, yet nonetheless maintain that this is compatible with a thoroughgoing objectivism. Some such objectivist responses make use of the “combo view” of the value-bearer—that is, they claim that it is not the object of the attitudes that have value but a combination of the object and the attitude. In responding to such objectivist arguments, the authors’ investigation sorts out the best understanding of the subjective/objective divide. The chapter is unique in sorting through several different such understandings and arguing for the authors’ own favored understanding. With a proper understanding of the divide, the above objectivist moves are revealed to be attempting to appropriate what is really subjective value.

Key concepts: Objectivism, Normative, Value (mathematics), Object (grammar), Epistemology, Psychology, Aesthetics, Sociology

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