2023•Journal for the Study of the Historical JesusOpen access

Subjugating Subjectivity: Why Wright’s Critical Realism is Not Critical Enough

Aaron K. Chidgzey

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Abstract

Abstract This analysis of N. T. Wright’s epistemological model – labelled critical realism – argues that Wright has lamentably failed the ambitious goal of mediating the two epistemic poles of external ‘objective’ reality and internal ‘subjective’ interpretation. The issues raised by scholars of the so-called ‘critical’ end of the dichotomy have subsequently failed to be considered to any significant degree and, instead, Wright ultimately reverts to an objectivist realism of the sort he decries. He privileges the assumptions on the ‘realism’ end and merely gestures toward the critical. This becomes especially clear in his study of Jesus’ resurrection, where his apologetic and historical discussions demonstrate a reliance upon an assumed objectivist and empiricist methodology.

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Abstract This analysis of N. T. Wright’s epistemological model – labelled critical realism – argues that Wright has lamentably failed the ambitious goal of mediating the two epistemic poles of external ‘objective’ reality and internal ‘subjective’ interpretation. The issues raised by scholars of the so-called ‘critical’ end of the dichotomy have subsequently failed to be considered to any significant degree and, instead, Wright ultimately reverts to an objectivist realism of the sort he decries. He privileges the assumptions on the ‘realism’ end and merely gestures toward the critical. This becomes especially clear in his study of Jesus’ resurrection, where his apologetic and historical discussions demonstrate a reliance upon an assumed objectivist and empiricist methodology.

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Available abstract

Abstract This analysis of N. T. Wright’s epistemological model – labelled critical realism – argues that Wright has lamentably failed the ambitious goal of mediating the two epistemic poles of external ‘objective’ reality and internal ‘subjective’ interpretation. The issues raised by scholars of the so-called ‘critical’ end of the dichotomy have subsequently failed to be considered to any significant degree and, instead, Wright ultimately reverts to an objectivist realism of the sort he decries. He privileges the assumptions on the ‘realism’ end and merely gestures toward the critical. This becomes especially clear in his study of Jesus’ resurrection, where his apologetic and historical discussions demonstrate a reliance upon an assumed objectivist and empiricist methodology.

Key concepts: Objectivism, Wright, Critical realism (philosophy of perception), Epistemology, Realism, Philosophy, Subjectivity, Interpretation (philosophy)

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