Moral self-consistency as the self-organization of moral identity: A social-cognitive approach

Abstract Within social-cognitive accounts of moral behavior, moral self-consistency or integrity, as conceptualized by Blasi, is assumed to link moral identity to moral behavior. The present study provides a novel account of moral self-consistency as an aspect of the self-organization of moral identity. I used two elements of moral identity to study moral self-consistency: moral values and moral scripts. The moral self-consistency of 410 participants was operationalized as the extent to which their responses on moral values, measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, predicted their responses on moral scripts, measured by the Moral Foundations Vignettes. I identified two types of moral self-consistency: (1) individualizing and (2) binding. As predicted, when the respondents’ moral integrity was activated, (a) individualizing moral self-consistency was greater if it focused on individual moral integrity rather than national moral integrity, and (b) liberals exhibited more binding moral self-consistency than conservatives. This paper discusses the implications and limitations of the present study, as well as the potential for further development of social-cognitive accounts of moral identity. “If you want to be a good person, make sure you know where true goodness really lies. Don’t just go through the motions of being good.” Ajahn Fuang Jotiko, Buddhist Monk (Bhikkhu, 1993, p. 10)