Reciprocal, but inequality averse as well? Mixed motives for punishment and reward
Andreas Leibbrandt, Raúl López‐Pérez, Eli Spiegelman
Abstract
Andreas Leibbrandt, Raúl López‐Pérez, Eli Spiegelman
Abstract
Considerable experimental evidence indicates that reciprocity and inequality aversion are important motivations to understand deviations from self-interested behavior, and in particular costly punishment and reward. We use a within-subject experimental design to evaluate the share of subjects whose second-party reward and punishment choices are best accounted for by pure reciprocity, pure inequality aversion, a mixture of these two motives, or other motivations like altruism or competitiveness. We find that the largest fraction of punishment and rewards is motivated by a mixture of both inequality aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequality aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to organize some results in the experimental literature on second-party punishment and reward.
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Considerable experimental evidence indicates that reciprocity and inequality aversion are important motivations to understand deviations from self-interested behavior, and in particular costly punishment and reward. We use a within-subject experimental design to evaluate the share of subjects whose second-party reward and punishment choices are best accounted for by pure reciprocity, pure inequality aversion, a mixture of these two motives, or other motivations like altruism or competitiveness. We find that the largest fraction of punishment and rewards is motivated by a mixture of both inequality aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequality aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to organize some results in the experimental literature on second-party punishment and reward.
Key concepts: Inequity aversion, Reciprocity (cultural anthropology), Punishment (psychology), Inequality, Altruism (biology), Reciprocal, Economics, Microeconomics