2023•Unpublished venueRequires access

Strategic Ignorance

Rik Peels

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter applies the epistemology of ignorance developed in part 1 to ideas and concepts in agnotology. It is argued that the conception of strategic ignorance in agnotology is not a rival to the New View defended in chapter 3, as it is a conception that zooms in on contingent properties of ignorance rather than accounting for the nature of ignorance. It also considers whether the field of agnotology better fits with the Standard View or with the New View. Subsequently, it discusses strategic ignorance on a group level. After that, it turns to the different kinds of ignorance distinguished in chapter 2: Can one in agnogenetic practices aim at objectual and practical ignorance as well? It also addresses the question of whether agnotology’s strategic ignorance is disbelieving, suspending, undecided, unconsidered, deep, or complete ignorance. Finally, it explains how agnotology can gain from taking the notion of degrees of ignorance on board.

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Abstract This chapter applies the epistemology of ignorance developed in part 1 to ideas and concepts in agnotology. It is argued that the conception of strategic ignorance in agnotology is not a rival to the New View defended in chapter 3, as it is a conception that zooms in on contingent properties of ignorance rather than accounting for the nature of ignorance. It also considers whether the field of agnotology better fits with the Standard View or with the New View. Subsequently, it discusses strategic ignorance on a group level. After that, it turns to the different kinds of ignorance distinguished in chapter 2: Can one in agnogenetic practices aim at objectual and practical ignorance as well? It also addresses the question of whether agnotology’s strategic ignorance is disbelieving, suspending, undecided, unconsidered, deep, or complete ignorance. Finally, it explains how agnotology can gain from taking the notion of degrees of ignorance on board.

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Available abstract

Abstract This chapter applies the epistemology of ignorance developed in part 1 to ideas and concepts in agnotology. It is argued that the conception of strategic ignorance in agnotology is not a rival to the New View defended in chapter 3, as it is a conception that zooms in on contingent properties of ignorance rather than accounting for the nature of ignorance. It also considers whether the field of agnotology better fits with the Standard View or with the New View. Subsequently, it discusses strategic ignorance on a group level. After that, it turns to the different kinds of ignorance distinguished in chapter 2: Can one in agnogenetic practices aim at objectual and practical ignorance as well? It also addresses the question of whether agnotology’s strategic ignorance is disbelieving, suspending, undecided, unconsidered, deep, or complete ignorance. Finally, it explains how agnotology can gain from taking the notion of degrees of ignorance on board.

Key concepts: Ignorance, Epistemology, Political science, Philosophy

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