Semantics for a Logic of Presuppositions
X. Y. Newberry
Abstract
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X. Y. Newberry
Abstract
Open-access reader
In 1952 P. F. Strawson proposed a logic of presuppositions. It is an interpretation of Aristotelian logic, i.e. of the logic of the traditional syllogism. In 1981 Richard Diaz published a monograph in which he presented truth-relevant logic. This paper shows that truth-relevant logic is but a propositional version of the logic of presuppositions. A semantics of the logic of presuppositions is developed using truth-relevant logic. The semantics is then further extended to polyadic logic and some consequences discussed.
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In 1952 P. F. Strawson proposed a logic of presuppositions. It is an interpretation of Aristotelian logic, i.e. of the logic of the traditional syllogism. In 1981 Richard Diaz published a monograph in which he presented truth-relevant logic. This paper shows that truth-relevant logic is but a propositional version of the logic of presuppositions. A semantics of the logic of presuppositions is developed using truth-relevant logic. The semantics is then further extended to polyadic logic and some consequences discussed.
Key concepts: Presupposition, Autoepistemic logic, Philosophy of logic, Many-valued logic, Multimodal logic, Term logic, Dynamic logic (digital electronics), Higher-order logic