The Past and Future Exist
Kristie Miller
Abstract
Kristie Miller
Abstract
This chapter is a reply to Chapter 2 of the book. It aims to show that the arguments in favour of presentism that were offered there fail. It takes up the idea that presentism is not more parsimonious than eternalism. It also argues that the presentist has a bad account of why it is that true past-tensed sentences are true, given that, on her view, there are no past things. Finally, it responds to the idea that the presentist can make good sense of relativity, and hence that science gives us no reason to prefer a block view to a presentist one.
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This chapter is a reply to Chapter 2 of the book. It aims to show that the arguments in favour of presentism that were offered there fail. It takes up the idea that presentism is not more parsimonious than eternalism. It also argues that the presentist has a bad account of why it is that true past-tensed sentences are true, given that, on her view, there are no past things. Finally, it responds to the idea that the presentist can make good sense of relativity, and hence that science gives us no reason to prefer a block view to a presentist one.
Key concepts: Presentism, Epistemology, Philosophy