The Problem of Vagueness in Analytic Metaphysics

The article is devoted to vagueness as a problem of analytical metaphysics. The specificity of the consideration of vagueness by philosophers-analysts lies in the appeal to the ancient sources of this problem and in the explication of its essential characteristics from the aporias of Eubulides. Modern metaphysical theories consider vagueness as a general term for those phenomena that: a) either demonstrate borderline cases, b) either do not have clear boundaries, c) or do not have strictly defined identity conditions. In modern metaphysics ontological, semantic and epistemic types of vagueness are distinguished. However, not all of them are equally valid. All cases of “ontological vagueness” ultimately come down either to the limitations of our cognitive tools, or to a language that is unable to unam­biguously “grasp” the essence of an object. Therefore, the ontological type of vague­ness seems to be insufficiently substantiated. Semantic vagueness is considered as a phenomenon that belongs only to the sphere of semantics (language) or concepts and is not a characteristic feature of the ontology of the world. Epistemic vagueness is thematicized as a kind of “ignorance”.