Wittgenstein and neopyrrhonism

Wittgenstein’s latest work, On Certainty, has not only been read as the dissolution of Cartesian skepticism but as a proposal of a new skepticism. This “new” skepticism has been understood by R. Fogelin (1976 [2002], 1981, 1994) as close to Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism. Therefore, he called it Neopyrrhonism. To Fogelin, both authors share the epistemological strategythat assumes that basic beliefs of common sense do not require any type of justification but cannotbe doubted either. My proposal is to review this epistemological interpretation of the notion of Neopyrrhonism in light of the metaphilosophical aspects developed by both authors. These aspects highlight the non-theoretical and therapeutic way of understanding philosophy, as well as the persuasive-argumentative abilities they share. Thus, I suggest conceiving of Neopyrrhonism as metaphilosophy rather than as one kind of philosophy focused on the problem of knowledge orjustification.