Improving diagnosis for disorders of consciousness: The case for a novel multi-paradigm approach
Yi An Wang, Adam M.R. Groh
Abstract
Open-access reader
Yi An Wang, Adam M.R. Groh
Abstract
Open-access reader
After a traumatic brain injury, patients often experience a period of impaired consciousness characterized by a diminished ability to perceive external stimuli (i.e., awareness) and a diminished responsiveness to stimuli, when perceived (i.e., arousal) [1,2]. These impaired levels of consciousness are defined as disorders of consciousness (DoC), a spectrum typically defined by three states of consciousness: coma, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS, formerly known as vegetative state), and minimally conscious state (MCS) [1].
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After a traumatic brain injury, patients often experience a period of impaired consciousness characterized by a diminished ability to perceive external stimuli (i.e., awareness) and a diminished responsiveness to stimuli, when perceived (i.e., arousal) [1,2]. These impaired levels of consciousness are defined as disorders of consciousness (DoC), a spectrum typically defined by three states of consciousness: coma, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS, formerly known as vegetative state), and minimally conscious state (MCS) [1].
Key concepts: Minimally conscious state, Persistent vegetative state, Wakefulness, Consciousness Disorders, Consciousness, Coma (optics), Arousal, Psychology