Are tax and expenditure limitations constraining institutions or institutionally irrelevant? Evidence from Minnesota
Jason Shumberger, Akheil Singla
Abstract
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Jason Shumberger, Akheil Singla
Abstract
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Abstract State‐imposed limitations on local government taxation and expenditures (TELs) are a common part of American federalism. But the consequences of TELs are the subject of debate. Are TELs institutional constraints that harm local governments? Or are TELs institutionally irrelevant veils easily pierced by political actors? This research uses the removal of an assessment restriction in Minnesota to evaluate the effect of TELs on the financial health of local governments. It finds that TEL removal had no effect on the financial health of Minnesota cities. Additional tests demonstrate that the results are not driven by a lack of bindingness in the TEL, by increases in property tax rates, or by new non‐property tax revenue. It concludes that TELs are closer to institutionally irrelevant than to meaningful constraints.
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Abstract State‐imposed limitations on local government taxation and expenditures (TELs) are a common part of American federalism. But the consequences of TELs are the subject of debate. Are TELs institutional constraints that harm local governments? Or are TELs institutionally irrelevant veils easily pierced by political actors? This research uses the removal of an assessment restriction in Minnesota to evaluate the effect of TELs on the financial health of local governments. It finds that TEL removal had no effect on the financial health of Minnesota cities. Additional tests demonstrate that the results are not driven by a lack of bindingness in the TEL, by increases in property tax rates, or by new non‐property tax revenue. It concludes that TELs are closer to institutionally irrelevant than to meaningful constraints.
Key concepts: Property tax, Public economics, Harm, Local government, Politics, Economics, Revenue, Tax revenue