2022Economic AlternativesOpen access

Ambiguous Strategy Choice in an Economic Game D(2,2) Describing a Competition

Georgi Kiranchev

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Abstract

This study examines in detail the game known as the “two-bar dilemma” in the general form of the payoff matrices of the two player direct competitors. This dilemma is exclusively in the field of economics and competition. Its familiarity is therefore useful for readers who are concerned with decision making in economics in a competitive environment. All conclusions are the result of mathematical proofs and not of specific numbers specifically selected for this purpose and therefore the conclusions are generalized over all possible variants of payment matrices. The game has been shown to be much more complex and rich in possibilities than the widely known “prisoner’s dilemma”, to which the “two-bar dilemma” game was wrongly considered a complete analogue. It is explained why these two games cannot be analogous and why the game “dilemma of the two bars” is a more complex case. It has been shown that it is possible to have two Nash equilibria, which is not possible in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

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This study examines in detail the game known as the “two-bar dilemma” in the general form of the payoff matrices of the two player direct competitors. This dilemma is exclusively in the field of economics and competition. Its familiarity is therefore useful for readers who are concerned with decision making in economics in a competitive environment. All conclusions are the result of mathematical proofs and not of specific numbers specifically selected for this purpose and therefore the conclusions are generalized over all possible variants of payment matrices. The game has been shown to be much more complex and rich in possibilities than the widely known “prisoner’s dilemma”, to which the “two-bar dilemma” game was wrongly considered a complete analogue. It is explained why these two games cannot be analogous and why the game “dilemma of the two bars” is a more complex case. It has been shown that it is possible to have two Nash equilibria, which is not possible in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

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Available abstract

This study examines in detail the game known as the “two-bar dilemma” in the general form of the payoff matrices of the two player direct competitors. This dilemma is exclusively in the field of economics and competition. Its familiarity is therefore useful for readers who are concerned with decision making in economics in a competitive environment. All conclusions are the result of mathematical proofs and not of specific numbers specifically selected for this purpose and therefore the conclusions are generalized over all possible variants of payment matrices. The game has been shown to be much more complex and rich in possibilities than the widely known “prisoner’s dilemma”, to which the “two-bar dilemma” game was wrongly considered a complete analogue. It is explained why these two games cannot be analogous and why the game “dilemma of the two bars” is a more complex case. It has been shown that it is possible to have two Nash equilibria, which is not possible in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Key concepts: Dilemma, Superrationality, Prisoner's dilemma, Mathematical economics, Game theory, Competitor analysis, Traveler's dilemma, Competition (biology)

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