Hume on The Epistemological Status of Metaphysical Statements
Stanley Tweyman
Abstract
Open-access reader
Stanley Tweyman
Abstract
Open-access reader
Abstract My paper examines critically the widespread view that Hume confines meaningful propositions to those which are analytic (a priori), and those which are synthetic empirical, thereby rejecting synthetic a priori propositions as meaningful. What I show is that Hume does recognize certain metaphysical synthetic a priori propositions as meaningful, thereby dispelling the traditional view that Hume rejects all synthetic a priori as meaningful.
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Abstract My paper examines critically the widespread view that Hume confines meaningful propositions to those which are analytic (a priori), and those which are synthetic empirical, thereby rejecting synthetic a priori propositions as meaningful. What I show is that Hume does recognize certain metaphysical synthetic a priori propositions as meaningful, thereby dispelling the traditional view that Hume rejects all synthetic a priori as meaningful.
Key concepts: A priori and a posteriori, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy, Psychology