Some Thoughts on the Logic of Strategic Arms Control: Three Perspectives
Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy, Tong Zhao
Abstract
Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy, Tong Zhao
Abstract
Who are the proponents of strategic arms control? Why do they advocate it? What are their major assumptions? What are the important uncertainties of arms control? What is the relationship between strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? This paper, the fifth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, explores these questions building on the perspectives of US, Chinese and Russian experts—Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy and Tong Zhao—and drawing in the views of diverse and informed participants in UNIDIR’s Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control.
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Who are the proponents of strategic arms control? Why do they advocate it? What are their major assumptions? What are the important uncertainties of arms control? What is the relationship between strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? This paper, the fifth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, explores these questions building on the perspectives of US, Chinese and Russian experts—Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy and Tong Zhao—and drawing in the views of diverse and informed participants in UNIDIR’s Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control.
Key concepts: Disarmament, Arms control, Deterrence theory, Control (management), Nuclear weapon, Political science, Law and economics, Law