Decision Theory
Michael G. Titelbaum
Abstract
Michael G. Titelbaum
Abstract
This chapter begins by introducing the notions of mathematical expectation and utility. Then we explain how expected utility theory connects preference rankings to credence and utilities. We develop Savage’s decision theory, Jeffrey’s evidential decision theory, and causal decision theory. Along the way, such problems as risk aversion, Allais’ paradox, and Newcomb’s problem are considered.
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This chapter begins by introducing the notions of mathematical expectation and utility. Then we explain how expected utility theory connects preference rankings to credence and utilities. We develop Savage’s decision theory, Jeffrey’s evidential decision theory, and causal decision theory. Along the way, such problems as risk aversion, Allais’ paradox, and Newcomb’s problem are considered.
Key concepts: Causal decision theory, Credence, Evidential decision theory, Expected utility hypothesis, Decision theory, Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem, Subjective expected utility, Mathematical economics