2006Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

What Would Teleological Causation Be? 1

John Hawthorne

Open publisher page 47 citations

Abstract

This chapter begins by identifying three features of Aristotle's teleology, and more generally of an Aristotelian frame of mind about teleology, that may induce suspicion. The first is that an end can serve as a ‘cause’: as well as the sort of causation we all recognize, efficient causation, there are other forms, one of which is teleological causation. The second is the suggestion that things other than agents are influenced by teleology, and that objects can have these ends or purposes non-derivatively from the ends or purposes of agents. The third is that teleological explanation can be fundamental: it need not itself be true in virtue of some underlying efficient causal facts. The chapter then discusses why we should care about teleology, the possibility of final causation, teleology and backward causation, and Aristotelian rocks and telic pyramids.

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This chapter begins by identifying three features of Aristotle's teleology, and more generally of an Aristotelian frame of mind about teleology, that may induce suspicion. The first is that an end can serve as a ‘cause’: as well as the sort of causation we all recognize, efficient causation, there are other forms, one of which is teleological causation. The second is the suggestion that things other than agents are influenced by teleology, and that objects can have these ends or purposes non-derivatively from the ends or purposes of agents. The third is that teleological explanation can be fundamental: it need not itself be true in virtue of some underlying efficient causal facts. The chapter then discusses why we should care about teleology, the possibility of final causation, teleology and backward causation, and Aristotelian rocks and telic pyramids.

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Available abstract

This chapter begins by identifying three features of Aristotle's teleology, and more generally of an Aristotelian frame of mind about teleology, that may induce suspicion. The first is that an end can serve as a ‘cause’: as well as the sort of causation we all recognize, efficient causation, there are other forms, one of which is teleological causation. The second is the suggestion that things other than agents are influenced by teleology, and that objects can have these ends or purposes non-derivatively from the ends or purposes of agents. The third is that teleological explanation can be fundamental: it need not itself be true in virtue of some underlying efficient causal facts. The chapter then discusses why we should care about teleology, the possibility of final causation, teleology and backward causation, and Aristotelian rocks and telic pyramids.

Key concepts: Teleology, Causation, Epistemology, Philosophy

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