Edward J. Zajac
Abstract
Abstract This theory examines the problems – and partial contractual solutions ( see Contracts) – that exist when a principal delegates Decision‐Making responsibility to an agent who is paid a fee, but whose own objectives may conflict with those of the principal.
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Abstract This theory examines the problems – and partial contractual solutions ( see Contracts) – that exist when a principal delegates Decision‐Making responsibility to an agent who is paid a fee, but whose own objectives may conflict with those of the principal.
Key concepts: Principal (computer security), Principal–agent problem, Agency (philosophy), Law and economics, Business, Mathematical economics, Political science, Economics