Cosmopolitanism
David Miller
Abstract
David Miller
Abstract
This chapter discusses the concept of cosmopolitanism. It begins by drawing a distinction between moral and political versions of cosmopolitanism. It then focuses on moral cosmopolitanism and its implications for global justice. It distinguishes between weak and strong versions of moral cosmopolitanism, where weak cosmopolitanism requires us to show equal moral concern for human beings everywhere, while strong cosmopolitanism goes beyond this to demand that we should afford them equal treatment, in a substantive sense. The chapter shows that strong cosmopolitanism is not entailed by weak cosmopolitanism; but it has not shown what exactly is wrong with strong cosmopolitanism, other than that it conflicts with an intuitively plausible picture of agents' responsibilities. Thus, it would still be possible for someone to present an independent argument to the effect that justice requires a strong form of equality at global level, and that our understanding of special responsibilities therefore needs to be reshaped to become consistent with such a requirement.
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This chapter discusses the concept of cosmopolitanism. It begins by drawing a distinction between moral and political versions of cosmopolitanism. It then focuses on moral cosmopolitanism and its implications for global justice. It distinguishes between weak and strong versions of moral cosmopolitanism, where weak cosmopolitanism requires us to show equal moral concern for human beings everywhere, while strong cosmopolitanism goes beyond this to demand that we should afford them equal treatment, in a substantive sense. The chapter shows that strong cosmopolitanism is not entailed by weak cosmopolitanism; but it has not shown what exactly is wrong with strong cosmopolitanism, other than that it conflicts with an intuitively plausible picture of agents' responsibilities. Thus, it would still be possible for someone to present an independent argument to the effect that justice requires a strong form of equality at global level, and that our understanding of special responsibilities therefore needs to be reshaped to become consistent with such a requirement.
Key concepts: Cosmopolitanism, Argument (complex analysis), Global justice, Economic Justice, Politics, Sociology, Epistemology, Political science