2016Unpublished venueOpen access

Omnipotence

Edward Wierenga

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Abstract

This chapter attempts to understand the property of omnipotence ("able to do anything"), and considers an objection that alleges that the very concept is incoherent. Then, it focuses on omniscience ("knows everything"), and examines the claim that divine omniscience is inconsistent with something many of us take to be true, namely, that we sometimes act with free will. The chapter also considers an objection that two of the divine attributes, perfect goodness and perfect freedom are inconsistent with each other. There is a long philosophical tradition, going back at least to Augustine, continuing through the major medieval Jewish, Christian, and Muslim philosophers, and extending up to the present, of attributing omnipotence to God. Augustine claims that God is unable to die or be deceived, and he concludes that God "cannot do some things for the very reason that he is omnipotent".

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This chapter attempts to understand the property of omnipotence ("able to do anything"), and considers an objection that alleges that the very concept is incoherent. Then, it focuses on omniscience ("knows everything"), and examines the claim that divine omniscience is inconsistent with something many of us take to be true, namely, that we sometimes act with free will. The chapter also considers an objection that two of the divine attributes, perfect goodness and perfect freedom are inconsistent with each other. There is a long philosophical tradition, going back at least to Augustine, continuing through the major medieval Jewish, Christian, and Muslim philosophers, and extending up to the present, of attributing omnipotence to God. Augustine claims that God is unable to die or be deceived, and he concludes that God "cannot do some things for the very reason that he is omnipotent".

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Available abstract

This chapter attempts to understand the property of omnipotence ("able to do anything"), and considers an objection that alleges that the very concept is incoherent. Then, it focuses on omniscience ("knows everything"), and examines the claim that divine omniscience is inconsistent with something many of us take to be true, namely, that we sometimes act with free will. The chapter also considers an objection that two of the divine attributes, perfect goodness and perfect freedom are inconsistent with each other. There is a long philosophical tradition, going back at least to Augustine, continuing through the major medieval Jewish, Christian, and Muslim philosophers, and extending up to the present, of attributing omnipotence to God. Augustine claims that God is unable to die or be deceived, and he concludes that God "cannot do some things for the very reason that he is omnipotent".

Key concepts: Omnipotence, Omniscience, Philosophy, Epistemology, Property (philosophy)

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