Intuitionism, Moral
Bruce Russell
Abstract
Bruce Russell
Abstract
Abstract Moral intuitionism is a view about how we can be justified in believing, and have knowledge of, moral propositions (seeEpistemology, Moral). To be more specific, moral intuitionism is the view thatmoral intuitionscan provide evidence for the truth of moral propositions. To be intuitively justified, the justification must be noninferential and based on intuition, and so not based on some sort of reasoning in which the relevant proposition is the conclusion. In a moment I will say more about the nature of intuitions, but, roughly, a person has an intuition of some proposition just in case that proposition seems obviously true to him and its seeming that way is basedsolelyon his understanding the proposition (for example, the proposition that bachelors are unmarried males).
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Abstract Moral intuitionism is a view about how we can be justified in believing, and have knowledge of, moral propositions (seeEpistemology, Moral). To be more specific, moral intuitionism is the view thatmoral intuitionscan provide evidence for the truth of moral propositions. To be intuitively justified, the justification must be noninferential and based on intuition, and so not based on some sort of reasoning in which the relevant proposition is the conclusion. In a moment I will say more about the nature of intuitions, but, roughly, a person has an intuition of some proposition just in case that proposition seems obviously true to him and its seeming that way is basedsolelyon his understanding the proposition (for example, the proposition that bachelors are unmarried males).
Key concepts: Intuitionism, Proposition, Intuition, Social intuitionism, Epistemology, Moral reasoning, Philosophy, Moral disengagement