Scepticism

Abstract Chapter 6 addresses the problem of scepticism. More specifically, it focuses on a particularly difficult sceptical argument which proceeds from the plausible claims (i) that we don’t know that we are not radically deceived and (ii) that, if so, we don’t know much at all to the problematic sceptical conclusion that we don’t know much at all. It is argued that there is reason to take issue with both premises of this argument. More specifically, Chapter 6 presents a novel theoretical argument against the principle the knowledge transmits across competent deduction, which motivates the second premise. And it develops a new way of resisting the first premise. The key idea here is that we can have basic knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses thanks to an ability to know that certain possibilities could not easily obtain. Having dealt with some objections, Chapter 6 compares the approach to scepticism developed here with its closest competitor, the sensitivity-based approach, and argues that there is reason to favour the former.