2000Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

Linguistic Indeterminacy

TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT

Open publisher page 22 citations

Abstract

This chapter introduces the notion of indeterminacy: the law is indeterminate when there is no single right answer to a question of law, or to a question of the application of the law to the facts of a case. It rejects the incoherent notion that the application of language is radically indeterminate, stressing the point that the application of vague language is indeterminate in some cases but not in all cases. It is possible to know that the linguistic formulation of a legal rule applies to the facts of some cases, but that mundane knowledge does not tell a judge what to do. Knowing whether the case fits the formulation of a rule does not even tell the judge what the law requires. The judge also needs to know whether the law requires that the rule be applied. Linguistic determinacy should not mislead judges into thinking that it will even be possible to make a just decision in every case.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

This chapter introduces the notion of indeterminacy: the law is indeterminate when there is no single right answer to a question of law, or to a question of the application of the law to the facts of a case. It rejects the incoherent notion that the application of language is radically indeterminate, stressing the point that the application of vague language is indeterminate in some cases but not in all cases. It is possible to know that the linguistic formulation of a legal rule applies to the facts of some cases, but that mundane knowledge does not tell a judge what to do. Knowing whether the case fits the formulation of a rule does not even tell the judge what the law requires. The judge also needs to know whether the law requires that the rule be applied. Linguistic determinacy should not mislead judges into thinking that it will even be possible to make a just decision in every case.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 22 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

This chapter introduces the notion of indeterminacy: the law is indeterminate when there is no single right answer to a question of law, or to a question of the application of the law to the facts of a case. It rejects the incoherent notion that the application of language is radically indeterminate, stressing the point that the application of vague language is indeterminate in some cases but not in all cases. It is possible to know that the linguistic formulation of a legal rule applies to the facts of some cases, but that mundane knowledge does not tell a judge what to do. Knowing whether the case fits the formulation of a rule does not even tell the judge what the law requires. The judge also needs to know whether the law requires that the rule be applied. Linguistic determinacy should not mislead judges into thinking that it will even be possible to make a just decision in every case.

Key concepts: Indeterminate, Indeterminacy (philosophy), Determinacy, Epistemology, Point (geometry), Linguistics, Philosophy, Law

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Linguistic Indeterminacy — Research Paper | ScholarLens