2008The New Palgrave Dictionary of EconomicsRequires access

strategic voting

Timothy Feddersen

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Abstract

Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

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Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

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Available abstract

Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

Key concepts: Cardinal voting systems, Bullet voting, Voting, Ballot, Disapproval voting, Anti-plurality voting, Group voting ticket, Approval voting

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