2022•Managerial and Decision EconomicsOpen access

Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis

Gregorio Sánchez Marín, María Encarnación Lucas‐Pérez, J. Samuel Baixauli‐Soler, Brian G. M. Main, Antonio Mínguez‐Vera

Abstract

Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8‐year panel data. Findings indicate that Spanish firms are characterized by higher excess executive compensation than UK firms because of the less effectiveness of ownership structure and board of directors. Differences in concentration and structure of ownership as well as in composition and size of boards result in more aligned executive compensation design in the UK firms.

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Key concepts: Executive compensation, Corporate governance, Accounting, Compensation (psychology), Business, Panel data, Economics, Finance