A Temporal Model for the Prisoner's Dilemma and an Iterated Attacker-Defender Network Game

We present a brief overview of a temporal hypergame framework that can be used to model classic game theoretic principles, in addition to games where there is a difference in perception. This paper discusses the application of the temporal hypergame framework to the classical game theoretic iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Using the temporal hypergame framework, the concept of backwards induction is shown as a solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma is symmetric and does not have differences in perception, therefore the structural properties do not allow for detailed hypergame analysis. Next, the temporal hypergame framework is applied to an attacker-defender network game. The attacker-defender network game is used to show how the framework can be applied under conditions of difference in perception. This examples used to show validity to the classical game theoretic problems to the hypergame framework.