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Conclusion: Options for Enhancing Transparency and Accountability through Self-Regulation and Regulation of Lobbying

OECD

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Abstract

This final chapter outlines various options available for self-regulation and government regulation of the lobbying profession and the ways to find the appropriate balance between them. The array of effective self-regulatory institutional mechanisms developed in Europe are analysed, such as the adoption of codes of conduct and making them mandatory, the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, and the imposition of a mandatory system of lobbyist registration and internet disclosure of activities.The chapter also recognises that self-regulation may not be effective in all situations and describes the ways in which regulation may enhance transparency and accountability. The regimes applied in the United States and Canada are highlighted as good practices for enhancing transparency in registration and disclosure as they provide broad, yet fairly clear lines distinguishing who must register and what information must be disclosed.The chapter also addresses measures aimed at public officials, such as restrictions on conflicts of interest, financial disclosure of investments and properties owned by government officials which have proved effective to reduce influence-peddling and building public trust in government.

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This final chapter outlines various options available for self-regulation and government regulation of the lobbying profession and the ways to find the appropriate balance between them. The array of effective self-regulatory institutional mechanisms developed in Europe are analysed, such as the adoption of codes of conduct and making them mandatory, the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, and the imposition of a mandatory system of lobbyist registration and internet disclosure of activities.The chapter also recognises that self-regulation may not be effective in all situations and describes the ways in which regulation may enhance transparency and accountability. The regimes applied in the United States and Canada are highlighted as good practices for enhancing transparency in registration and disclosure as they provide broad, yet fairly clear lines distinguishing who must register and what information must be disclosed.The chapter also addresses measures aimed at public officials, such as restrictions on conflicts of interest, financial disclosure of investments and properties owned by government officials which have proved effective to reduce influence-peddling and building public trust in government.

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Available abstract

This final chapter outlines various options available for self-regulation and government regulation of the lobbying profession and the ways to find the appropriate balance between them. The array of effective self-regulatory institutional mechanisms developed in Europe are analysed, such as the adoption of codes of conduct and making them mandatory, the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, and the imposition of a mandatory system of lobbyist registration and internet disclosure of activities.The chapter also recognises that self-regulation may not be effective in all situations and describes the ways in which regulation may enhance transparency and accountability. The regimes applied in the United States and Canada are highlighted as good practices for enhancing transparency in registration and disclosure as they provide broad, yet fairly clear lines distinguishing who must register and what information must be disclosed.The chapter also addresses measures aimed at public officials, such as restrictions on conflicts of interest, financial disclosure of investments and properties owned by government officials which have proved effective to reduce influence-peddling and building public trust in government.

Key concepts: Transparency (behavior), Accountability, Enforcement, Business, Government (linguistics), Public disclosure, Government regulation, The Internet

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