“MY TONGUE SWORE BUT MY HEART DID NOT”: VINDICATING ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AGAINST THE PROCUSTEAN BED OF SCIENTISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Often vilified, if not outright rejected, ordinary language philosophy has been sustained, from its very beginnings, due to the farne of authors such as Austin and the later Wittgenstein; but not, however, on its own merits. These, w hen recognized, are branded as either constituting a bad philosophy of language, or simply a bad philosophy altogether. Thus, same charitable interpretations have tried to domesticate its methods to make it compatible with a mare orthodox philosophy of language. Very gradually, however, this situation is changing, largely thanks to the influence that Stanley Cavell's philosophy is having on several generations of philosophers. The main thing is to convince ourselves that ordinary language philosophy is not strictly speaking a philosophy of language. It is a philosophy that proceeds from the ordinary and pays attention to the importance that the ordinary has for philosophy. We will, in the course of this article, analyze the criticisms and attempts to domesticate ordinary language philosophy and will anticipate Cavell's defense of the ordinary language philosophy as practiced by Austin and Ryle in Cavell's inheritance of the farmer.