Metaphor identification: A cognitive approach

1. The Cognitive Paradigm and Linguistic Metaphor identification One paradoxical effect of the cognitive turn in metaphor studies has been the neglect of the linguistic analysis of metaphorical language. Many metaphor scholars have concentrated on fleshing out the presumed conceptual connections between related metaphorical expressions, but they have not really turned back to examine how and why which conceptual metaphors are expressed in the way they are in which contexts of language use. In recent years there has been some improvement of this situation, but the balance has still not quite been adjusted (cf. Cameron and Low; Deignan; Goatly Language of Metaphors; and Gibbs and Steen). One of the reasons for this slow development of an examination of linguistic metaphor is that it involves a transition from one type of metaphor research to another. Most cognitive linguistic research on metaphor may be characterised as theory building, in which concepts and hypotheses are developed about the nature of conceptual metaphor. To be sure, such theories have empirical underpinnings, in that their authors are careful to collect many linguistic examples that corroborate their theoretical constructs. To put this slightly differently, these are theories meant to be put to the test in empirical research. In that respect, they are not like the hermeneutic theories of philosophers like Ricoeur or the analytical theories of philosophers like Davidson. However, when such cognitive-linguistic ideas are actually tested in linguistic research, practical problems arise which require their own solutions. In particular, the most urgent problem is the reliable identification of metaphors in on-going discourse. If cognitive metaphor theories are to be tested or applied to authentic language use, the reliable identification of linguistic metaphors is a conditio sine qua non. For linguistic research does not set out with a preconceived set of conceptual metaphors, but instead has to deal with spontaneous metaphorical expressions as they are encountered in concrete uncontrolled language use. There is a decided difference between the postulation of conceptual metaphors such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, HAPPY IS UP, and so on, as well as their illustration by well-chosen examples, on the one hand, and the technical identification in on-going discourse of expressions presumably related to such postulated conceptual metaphors, on the other hand. Of course, many researchers have attempted to bridge the gap between the cognitive theory of metaphor and the identification of linguistic metaphor in analyses of individual texts and discourse, or, indeed, in their development of textual materials for experimental purposes. However, these researchers have all had to rely on their own solution to the problem of formulating an operational definition of linguistic metaphor. A meta-analysis of such studies might well be able to show that there is a good deal of variation between these definitions. An explanation of this lack of a reliable instrument for metaphor identification may lie in the two main traditions dealing with cognitive metaphor. Psychologists do believe in the importance of reliable measuring instruments, but, as far as metaphor identification is concerned, they have not really needed one for their experimental purposes. They can simply adopt the same strategy as the cognitive linguists who are in the business of theory formation, and restrict themselves to relatively clear and pre-selected cases. Cognitive anthropologists, linguists, and pocticians, by contrast, do not work in a tradition where the reliability of a measuring instrument has to be evaluated and reported. Scholars who work on literary texts or on the analysis of metaphor in conversation, in particular, are used to supporting their method with argumentation, often celebrating the combination of analysis and interpretation rather than separating them out in the service of achieving reliability. …