1996•Cambridge University Press eBooksRequires access

Assembling ourselves

Nikolas Rose

Open publisher page 5 citations

Abstract

The idea of ‘the self’ has entered a crisis that may well be irreversible. Social theorists have written countless obituaries of the image of the human being that animated our philosophies and our ethics for so long: the universal subject, stable, unified, totalized, individualized, interiorized. For some accounts, in particular those inspired by psychoanalysis, this image was always ‘imaginary’: humans never existed, never could exist in this coherent and unified form – human ontology is necessarily of a creature riven at its very core. For others, this ‘death of the subject’ is itself a real historical event: the individual to which this image of the subject corresponded emerged only recently in a limited time-space zone, and has now been swept away by cultural change. In the place of the self, new images of subjectivity proliferate: as socially constructed, as dialogic, as inscribed upon the surface of the body, as spatialized, decentered, multiple, nomadic, created in episodic recognition-seeking practices of self-display in particular times and places. The hypotheses that I have put forward in this book should certainly be located within this problem space. However, I have also tried to address myself to a reciprocal set of problems concerning ‘the self’: the peculiar fact that at the very moment when this image of the human being is pronounced passé by social theorists, regulatory practices seek to govern individuals in a way more tied to their ‘selfhood’ than ever before, and the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience in so many of the practices in which human beings engage.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The idea of ‘the self’ has entered a crisis that may well be irreversible. Social theorists have written countless obituaries of the image of the human being that animated our philosophies and our ethics for so long: the universal subject, stable, unified, totalized, individualized, interiorized. For some accounts, in particular those inspired by psychoanalysis, this image was always ‘imaginary’: humans never existed, never could exist in this coherent and unified form – human ontology is necessarily of a creature riven at its very core. For others, this ‘death of the subject’ is itself a real historical event: the individual to which this image of the subject corresponded emerged only recently in a limited time-space zone, and has now been swept away by cultural change. In the place of the self, new images of subjectivity proliferate: as socially constructed, as dialogic, as inscribed upon the surface of the body, as spatialized, decentered, multiple, nomadic, created in episodic recognition-seeking practices of self-display in particular times and places. The hypotheses that I have put forward in this book should certainly be located within this problem space. However, I have also tried to address myself to a reciprocal set of problems concerning ‘the self’: the peculiar fact that at the very moment when this image of the human being is pronounced passé by social theorists, regulatory practices seek to govern individuals in a way more tied to their ‘selfhood’ than ever before, and the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience in so many of the practices in which human beings engage.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 5 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The idea of ‘the self’ has entered a crisis that may well be irreversible. Social theorists have written countless obituaries of the image of the human being that animated our philosophies and our ethics for so long: the universal subject, stable, unified, totalized, individualized, interiorized. For some accounts, in particular those inspired by psychoanalysis, this image was always ‘imaginary’: humans never existed, never could exist in this coherent and unified form – human ontology is necessarily of a creature riven at its very core. For others, this ‘death of the subject’ is itself a real historical event: the individual to which this image of the subject corresponded emerged only recently in a limited time-space zone, and has now been swept away by cultural change. In the place of the self, new images of subjectivity proliferate: as socially constructed, as dialogic, as inscribed upon the surface of the body, as spatialized, decentered, multiple, nomadic, created in episodic recognition-seeking practices of self-display in particular times and places. The hypotheses that I have put forward in this book should certainly be located within this problem space. However, I have also tried to address myself to a reciprocal set of problems concerning ‘the self’: the peculiar fact that at the very moment when this image of the human being is pronounced passé by social theorists, regulatory practices seek to govern individuals in a way more tied to their ‘selfhood’ than ever before, and the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience in so many of the practices in which human beings engage.

Key concepts: Subject (documents), The Imaginary, Inscribed figure, Subjectivity, Self, Dialogic, Agency (philosophy), Epistemology

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Assembling ourselves — Research Paper | ScholarLens