Recent Interpretations of the CPLR by New York Appellate Courts

To borrow an analogy from Charles Dickens, New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules CCPLR) might appropriately be described as tale of two faces. (1) Or perhaps better allusion is to Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. (2) Certain provisions of CPLR, as well as their interpretations by appellate courts, are forgiving and flexible. In fact, within its first four sections, CPLR mandates a liberal construction of its provisions to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding. (3) The CPLR also empowers judiciary to correct mistakes, omissions, and extend deadlines. (4) On other hand, there is no shortage of cases where CPLR has been interpreted with exacting rigidity, leaving in their wake a host of unsuspecting practitioners and litigants procedurally foreclosed from substantive relief. Recent appellate decisions interpreting various CPLR provisions reflect this continuing dichotomy, although trend appears to be towards more flexible and liberal interpretation where circumstances of a particular case permit such a result. The following is a review of several of those cases from 2009 and 2010, as well as other notable cases involving interpretation or application of various provisions in CPLR. (5) I. THE CPLR AS INTERPRETED IN 2009 & 2010: MORE JEKYLL THAN HYDE A. CPLR 5511--Who Is an Aggrieved Party? Since this article is within a publication dedicated to New York Appeals, perhaps best place to begin is with an appellate issue. CPLR 5511 states: An or a person substituted for him may appeal from any appealable judgment or order except one entered upon default of party. (6) Generally, determining if a is within meaning of CPLR 5511 is a fairly straightforward analysis. If a who asked for relief in lower court received all relief he or she requested, that is not aggrieved. On other hand, if a asks for relief and that relief is denied, is aggrieved. Two recent cases, however, were not so straightforward, requiring courts to interpret meaning of aggrieved party in CPLR 5511. In Adams v. Genie Industries, Inc., a products liability case, jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded $500,000 in damages for total pain and suffering. (7) The trial court denied defendant's motion to set aside verdict, but granted plaintiffs motion for an additur increasing pain and suffering award to $1.25 million. (8) The defendant appealed and Appellate Division affirmed. (9) The defendant then stipulated to additur and Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to Court of Appeals. (10) In Court of Appeals, defendant raised no issue concerning additur, but argued that evidence was insufficient to establish liability or, in alternative, that a new trial should have been ordered. (11) Before considering merits of appeal, Court of Appeals addressed issue of whether defendant had a right to take an appeal from Appellate Division's order after having stipulated to additur. (12) The plaintiff argued that defendant did not have a right to appeal, relying on two prior Court of Appeals cases, Batavia Turf Farms v. County of Genesee and Whitfield v. City of New York. (13) In Batavia and Whitfield, Court had held that a that stipulated to a reduction in damages in lieu of a new trial foreclosed all further review of other issues. (14) The rationale underlying this result was that the stipulation did not merely resolve an issue, but also fulfilled a condition for existence of order in question. (15) In Adams, however, Court of Appeals found that rule in Batavia and Whitfield was not justified. Instead, Court found [i]t is unfair to bar a from raising legitimate appellate issues simply because that has made an unrelated agreement on amount of damages. …