A Working Theory of Operational Art in Modern War

This paper proposes a working theory of operational art as practiced in counterinsurgency war (i.e., modern war). The underlying hypothesis of the paper is that operational art in modern war uses different logic than that used in conventional war. The inspiration for this hypothesis comes from Final Draft FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, 24 June 1988. This draft manual states that operational commanders use a conventional warfare type logic process when planning for LIC. For structure and comparison, this paper's base is built upon an analysis of the theory of operational art in conventional warfare as articulated in Professor James J. Schneider's "Theoretical Paper No. 3, The Theory of Operational Art." Since conventional operational theory enjoys broad consensus, it is convenient to use it as a familiar point of departure to introduce theoretical propositions for modern war that are qualitatively different from conventional war. The paper proceeds from a definition of operational art in modern war. This is followed by a discussion of the linkage between the domains of war and constructive/destructive forces. Friction and fog are next discussed, followed by the ends-ways-means-risk relationship of operational planning. A section on materials will introduce the concept of centers of gravity. Schneider's analogy of the operational commander and the artistic painter helps to understand the next section entitled "the operational canvas." The final two sections will address the tools and methods available to the operational commander.