Airborne Electronic Warfare: Issues for the 107th Congress

Electronic warfare (EW) has been an important component of military air operations since the earliest days of radar. Radar, EW, and stealth techniques have evolved over time as engineers, scientists, and tacticians have struggled to create the most survivable and effective air force possible. Several recent events suggest that airborne EW merits congressional attention. Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO operation in Yugoslavia, appears to have marked an important watershed in the debate over current and future U.S. airborne EW. It appears that every air strike on Serbian targets was protected by radar jamming and/or suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft. Electronic countermeasures self protection systems, such as towed radar decoys, were credited with saving numerous U.S. aircraft that had been targeted by Serbian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Department of Defense is engaged in numerous activities - such as research and development (R&D) programs, procurement programs, training, experimentation - that are designed to improve various electronic attack (EA), ECM, and SEAD capabilities both in the near and long term. These activities often cut across bureaucratic boundaries and defy easy categorization and oversight, which makes it difficult to determine and assess DoD-wide EW priorities. Often, it appears that DoD has no single, coherent plan coordinating all these efforts or setting priorities. The Clinton Administration's DoD budget request for FY2001 was the 106th Congress' first opportunity to exercise oversight of EW and SEAD programs in the post-Kosovo era. Congressional appropriations and authorization conferees often matched or exceeded DoD's request for EW and SEAD programs to ensure the survivability of numerous aircraft and to increase the military's ability to suppress or destroy enemy air defenses. Congress also disagreed with DoD plans, and reduced or constrained some programs accordingly.