2019Unpublished venueRequires access

Arms Control and Defense Planning in Soviet Strategic Policy

Benjamin S. Lambeth

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Abstract

During the formative years of the post-war era when the United States was clearly the predominant nuclear power, Soviet Union made almost a national industry of generating multiple negotiatory schemes couched in the language of "general and complete disarmament." With the advent of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Soviet arms control behavior became dramatically transformed from hollow diplomatic drum-beating at the United Nations to a serious pursuit of bilateral negotiations aimed at achieving realistic agreements whose terms might ultimately serve Soviet security interests. During the initial SALT I discussions on offensive forces, the Soviet delegation adamantly refused to agree on a precise definition of what constituted a "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missile systems and succeeded in producing a settlement that remained studiously vague regarding permissible volumetric expansion of SS-11 silos. The initial Soviet SALT delegation was nominally headed by a seasoned Foreign Ministry official, Vladimir Semenov, its overall composition was heavily weighted with representatives from the armed forces and defense-related ministries.

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During the formative years of the post-war era when the United States was clearly the predominant nuclear power, Soviet Union made almost a national industry of generating multiple negotiatory schemes couched in the language of "general and complete disarmament." With the advent of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Soviet arms control behavior became dramatically transformed from hollow diplomatic drum-beating at the United Nations to a serious pursuit of bilateral negotiations aimed at achieving realistic agreements whose terms might ultimately serve Soviet security interests. During the initial SALT I discussions on offensive forces, the Soviet delegation adamantly refused to agree on a precise definition of what constituted a "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missile systems and succeeded in producing a settlement that remained studiously vague regarding permissible volumetric expansion of SS-11 silos. The initial Soviet SALT delegation was nominally headed by a seasoned Foreign Ministry official, Vladimir Semenov, its overall composition was heavily weighted with representatives from the armed forces and defense-related ministries.

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Available abstract

During the formative years of the post-war era when the United States was clearly the predominant nuclear power, Soviet Union made almost a national industry of generating multiple negotiatory schemes couched in the language of "general and complete disarmament." With the advent of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Soviet arms control behavior became dramatically transformed from hollow diplomatic drum-beating at the United Nations to a serious pursuit of bilateral negotiations aimed at achieving realistic agreements whose terms might ultimately serve Soviet security interests. During the initial SALT I discussions on offensive forces, the Soviet delegation adamantly refused to agree on a precise definition of what constituted a "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missile systems and succeeded in producing a settlement that remained studiously vague regarding permissible volumetric expansion of SS-11 silos. The initial Soviet SALT delegation was nominally headed by a seasoned Foreign Ministry official, Vladimir Semenov, its overall composition was heavily weighted with representatives from the armed forces and defense-related ministries.

Key concepts: Arms control, Strategic Defense Initiative, Control (management), Political science, Business, Management, Engineering, Economics

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