Democratic Foreign Policy and the Cold War: Variations in Behavior during Periods of International Constraint

AbstractA growing body of literature, drawing on comparative perspectives, argues that democracies vary to such an extent that they should not be treated as homogenously as they are by democratic peace theory. The article, therefore, returns to the monadic hypothesis to disaggregate the democratic peace. The Cold War period is examined based on the expectations that the foreign policy behaviors of democracies should have been constrained by systemic bipolarity in addition to domestic democratic governance. Using Lijphart's dichotomous typology of democracies, the evidence indicates that institutional variation can affect the foreign policy of democracies even during times of systemic constraint as majoritarianism is found to be linked with more conflict-prone foreign policies than consensualism. It is argued that consensual democracies have institutional and procedural structures that restrain adventuresome executives while the majoritarian pattern of executive power concentrations provides a greater opportunity for leaders who view the international environment in conflictual terms to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The evidence supports these expectations.Key Words: Democracy, Institutions, Foreign Policy, Cold WarMuch has been written about the foreign policy tendencies of democracies. A great deal of evidence has been found suggesting that democracies rarely engage in direct, militarized disputes with other democracies (Singer and Small 1976; Doyle 1983; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). More recently, researchers have begun to look at the nuances of what causes variation in conflict and cooperation in the foreign policies of democracies (see Risse-Kappen 1991; Owen 1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Kaarbo 1996; Braumoeller 1997; Auerswald 1999; Gaubatz 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004, Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Clare 2010). This process of specification has led to the inclusion of variables such as threat perception, leadership style, political parties, institutional structures, political oppositions, ideology, electoral cycles, decision-making processes and the depth of liberal philosophy into the theoretical discourse. Although dyadic relations among democracies are not ignored by conflict and cooperation literature, the approach focuses more generally on why democracies pursue conflictual or cooperative foreign policies. In other words, monadic and dyadic relations are subject to examination. This research continues along this path.Although supporters of democratic peace theory acknowledge that democracies can be aggressive towards non-democracies, they argue that the evidence indicates that democracies do not fight one another due to domestic level variables inherent in democracies. Others are less certain (See Farber and Gowa 1995; Risse Kappen 1995; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 1994). Some have argued that conflict among democracies is masked by narrow definitions of democracy such as in the War of 1812, the Spanish- American War, or Imperial Germany and World War I (Oren 1995; Peceny 1997).To address the definitional criticism, Owen (1994) suggests that it is not democracy that prevents wars between democracies, but rather liberalism within democracies. In other words, it is cultural liberalism and the associated values that prevent aggressive foreign policies, not just simply democratic procedures. From this point of view, illiberal democracies (i.e. democracies that limit participation and civil rights and lack institutions that promote equality) may be more prone to militarized interstate disputes. From a theoretical perspective, what Owen is suggesting is that rather than focusing on interactions between democracies, we need to look inside the box.I agree with Owen and assume that we need to look inside the black box to assess the foreign policy of democracies. Rather than focus solely on the more abstract notion of cultural values, however, I argue that differences in procedural democracy may in fact account for divergent foreign policy outputs. …