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Defense Acquisition Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon System Decisions

David M. Walker

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Abstract

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in its acquisition of weapon systems and the application of best practices to help address those issues. With DOD's annual research, development, and production spending for weapon systems at about $85 billion-coupled with suggestions from within DOD and the Congress that it should be substantially higher-the Subcommittee's oversight of acquisition policy can have a major impact on the value the taxpayer gets for that expenditure. After having done hundreds of reviews of major weapon systems over the last 20 years, we have seen many of the same problems recur-cost increases, schedule delays, and performance problems. At your request, we have undertaken a body of work that examines weapon acquisition issues from a different, more cross-cutting perspective-one that draws lessons learned from the best commercial product development efforts to see if they apply to weapon system development. In the past few years, leading commercial firms have developed increasingly sophisticated products in significantly less time and at lower cost. These firms include the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Bombardier Aerospace, Caterpillar, Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Hughes Space and Communications, Motorola Corporation, and 3M. Our work shows that valuable lessons can be learned from the commercial sector and can be applied to the development of weapon systems.

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I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in its acquisition of weapon systems and the application of best practices to help address those issues. With DOD's annual research, development, and production spending for weapon systems at about $85 billion-coupled with suggestions from within DOD and the Congress that it should be substantially higher-the Subcommittee's oversight of acquisition policy can have a major impact on the value the taxpayer gets for that expenditure. After having done hundreds of reviews of major weapon systems over the last 20 years, we have seen many of the same problems recur-cost increases, schedule delays, and performance problems. At your request, we have undertaken a body of work that examines weapon acquisition issues from a different, more cross-cutting perspective-one that draws lessons learned from the best commercial product development efforts to see if they apply to weapon system development. In the past few years, leading commercial firms have developed increasingly sophisticated products in significantly less time and at lower cost. These firms include the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Bombardier Aerospace, Caterpillar, Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Hughes Space and Communications, Motorola Corporation, and 3M. Our work shows that valuable lessons can be learned from the commercial sector and can be applied to the development of weapon systems.

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Available abstract

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in its acquisition of weapon systems and the application of best practices to help address those issues. With DOD's annual research, development, and production spending for weapon systems at about $85 billion-coupled with suggestions from within DOD and the Congress that it should be substantially higher-the Subcommittee's oversight of acquisition policy can have a major impact on the value the taxpayer gets for that expenditure. After having done hundreds of reviews of major weapon systems over the last 20 years, we have seen many of the same problems recur-cost increases, schedule delays, and performance problems. At your request, we have undertaken a body of work that examines weapon acquisition issues from a different, more cross-cutting perspective-one that draws lessons learned from the best commercial product development efforts to see if they apply to weapon system development. In the past few years, leading commercial firms have developed increasingly sophisticated products in significantly less time and at lower cost. These firms include the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Bombardier Aerospace, Caterpillar, Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Hughes Space and Communications, Motorola Corporation, and 3M. Our work shows that valuable lessons can be learned from the commercial sector and can be applied to the development of weapon systems.

Key concepts: Weapon system, Corporation, Aerospace, Schedule, Work (physics), Product (mathematics), Taxpayer, Engineering

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